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Abstract. It has been suggested that observed cognitive limitations may be an expression
of the quantum-like structure of the mind. In this paper we explore some implications
of this hypothesis for learning i.e., for the construction of a representation of the world.
For a quantum-like individual, there exists a multiplicity of mentally incompatible (Bohr
complementary) but equally valid and complete representations (mental pictures) of the
world. The process of learning i.e., of constructing a representation involves two kinds
of operations on the mental picture. The acquisition of new data which is modelled as a
preparation procedure and the processing of data which is modelled as an introspective
measurement operation. This process is shown not converge to a single mental picture but
can evolve forever. We define a concept of entropy to capture relative intrinsic uncertainty.
The analysis suggests a new perspective on learning. First, it implies that we must turn
to double objectification as in Quantum Mechanics: the cognitive process is the primary
object of learning. Second, it suggests that a representation of the world arises as the
result of creative interplay between the mind and the environment. There is a degree of
freedom that modifies the objective of rational learning.
Keywords: learning, Bohr complementarity, information, uncertainty.
AMS classification: 81Q99, 91C99.
Introduction
It is a common place that human beings are not capable of holding very complex
picture in mind (cf "small worlds" in Savage 1954). We consider reality focusing on
one perspective at a time and show difficulties in combining perspectives as amply doc-
umented. This inability to seize reality in its full richness suggests that the process of
developing an understanding of the world may not look like a puzzle that is assembled
1 This contribution was presented at the Purdue Winer Memorial Lectures, 1-3 November
2014. To appear in Advanced Series on Mathematical Psychology, edited by Hans Colonius and
Ehtibar Dzhafarov, World Scientific Review Volume.
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progressively. Instead, the human mind may exhibit structural limitations in terms of
the incompatibility of perspectives in a way similar to properties in quantum mechanics.
Ambiguous pictures of the kind provided in diag. 1 provides a suggestive illustration of
this phenomenon.
Quantum Mechanics is a theory about the physical world. Its object is sub-atomic par-
ticles. The well-known "strange" features arise when an observer attempts to learn about
a sub-atomic system by means of a measurement device. A fundamental concept in QM is
Bohr complementarity: two properties can be incompatible in the sense that they cannot
have a determinate value simultaneously. As a consequence it is impossible to experimen-
tally access that physical world without interacting with it in a non-deterministic manner.
Intrinsic indeterminacy fundamentally changes the way we have to think about the phys-
ical reality or at least about the physical reality that we can have some knowledge about.
It introduce non-separability between the measurement process and the world. There is
no (accessible) given "outside world" but a contextual world in which we play an active
role.
For some time the quantum paradigm has been proposed to described among other
things aspects of the human psyche including preferences, attitudes and judgements
in decision theory and psychology (Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009, Busemeyer Bruza 2012,
Khrenikov 2010 among others). In this paper we take a step forward in recognizing that
knowledge is also an (psychic) object which in itself may exhibit non-classical features
and we derive some implications of this hypothesis for learning.
The approach can be viewed as a reversal of standard QM in the following sense. A
person considers a classical object e.g., a state agency, but her knowledge about it i.e., the
mental picture in her mind can behave in a non-classical way. Since human beings makes
decisions on the basis of perceived reality i.e., of mental pictures, our approach extends
the possible practical relevance of the quantum paradigm beyond sub-atomic physics to
much of macroscopic reality.
The most important element of our theory is Bohr-complementarity of mental perspec-
tives of one and the same object. They parallel that of properties for sub-atomic particles
e.g., spin along different angles. We propose that Bohr complementarity of perspectives
captures the cognitive limitations that are responsible for our difficulties to synthese infor-
mation along different perspectives into one single coherent picture. The difficulties arise
from the impossibility for incompatible perspectives to simultaneously have determinate
value. Just as in quantum physics, the system (here our mental picture) makes discrete
jumps when attempting (by means of introspection) to find a determinate value along a
series of incompatible perspectives.2
2Let us take an example. we are interested in learning about a state agency. We may learn everything
about the recruitment system which informs about the qualifications of people in various positions. It
is a personnel perspective that we can map back to a perspective guided by say a concern about the
correctness of a decision. If we next learn about the allocation of responsibility and associated path of
decisions, it activates other concepts (another network of neurones). We then try to map back into a
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Figure 1. What do you see ?
We model the cognitive process of learning as involving two essentially different opera-
tions. The first operation corresponds to receiving information framed according to some
perspective. We model this as a preparation procedure. The second operation entails
processing information or updating the mental picture in terms of one’s preferred per-
spective. It is modeled as an introspective measurement operation. This learning process
is not Bayesian as soon as we allow for Bohr complementarity of perspectives. The issue
of learning by non-classically minded agents has been approached in Danilov and Lambert
Mogiliansky [7, 8] and more recently in Busemeyer and Bruza [4].
1. The basic model
The parallel with QM is as follows: the system is the represented world, it is a psychic
object. At any point in time the individual’s knowledge about the (represented) world is
captured by the current mental picture or state. We denote it |ϕ〉 ∈ H where H is finite
dimensional Hilbert space of mental pictures of the (relevant) world. The state can be
characterized from different perspectives. A perspective is modelled as an operator similar
to an observable. It operates on the mental picture to generate an outcome, a possible (set
of ) picture(s) belonging to that perspective. The present analysis addresses incomplete
knowledge due to either incomplete information or quantum indeterminacy or both.
1-1. The notion of measurement
Before entering into the analysis let us remind of some basic notions and how they
relate to our issue. Generally, a measurement is an interaction between a system and some
measurement device, which yields some result, the outcome of the measurement that we
can observe and record.3 Two measurements are compatible if they, roughly speaking, can
perspective, we find out that it is not consistent with out earlier held beliefs.
3For instance in the case of the Stern–Gerlach experimental setup, we let the electron travel through
a non-homogeneous magnetic field and observe deviation either up or down. In another example we let
people play the Prisoner Dilemma (or the UG) and observe their choice. In the present context we see
part of the cognitive process (see below) as a measurement of the mental picture.
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be performed simultaneously or more precisely, if the performance of one measurement
does not affect the result of the other. Suppose that the first measurement gave outcome
o; then we perform the second measurement and the first one anew. In case we are dealing
with compatible measurements we obtain outcome o with certainty. If all measurements
are compatible we can substitute them with a single finest (complete) measurement, which
is also first-kind.4 Performing that measurement we learn everything about the system.
Such a system is classical. The existence of incompatible measurements is a distinctive
feature of non-classical systems. It is closely related to the impact of measurements on
the state and to the existence of “dispersed” states. A state is dispersion-free when the
outcome of every possible measurement is uniquely determined, there is no reason for the
state to change. If all pure states are dispersion-free then measurements do not impact
on pure states and therefore all measurements are compatible. On the contrary, if a state
is dispersed then by necessity it will be modified by an appropriate measurement. On the
other hand, the change in a pure state is the reason for incompatibility of measurements.
The initial outcome of a first measurement is not repeated because the system has been
modified by a second measurement (see Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky [7, 8]).
In this paper a measurement is an introspective operation that acts on the agent’s
mental picture. The agent’s asks himself a question: what are the implications of new
information for my understanding of a specific matter? and an answer, the outcome of
the mental process is brought to consciousness e.g., my current understanding in terms
of a recommendation for action. We propose that some cognitive limitations documented
by practitioners (give references) can be suitably modelled as the result of incompatible
mental operations that act on the mental picture to modify it.
1-2. Pure and mixed mental states
A pure state is a maximal information state. It may be the eigenstate of some perspec-
tive so it gives maximal and precise knowledge of the world along some perspective. Or it
may be a superposed state i.e., not the eigenstate of any perspective (observable). Such a
state also contains maximal knowledge but is characterized by some "dispersion entropy"
(see definition below). No measurement can be performed on a pure state and provide
new information without losing some information.5 In contrast a mixed state is a familiar
probabilistic combination of states which reflects incomplete knowledge. Measurements
can be performed on a mixed state to reach a maximal information pure state. In this
section we briefly discuss how a mixture of mental states can emerge.
At a first a mixed state seems to be a most natural mental object. So for instance the
"world" is a friend’s mood. You may be able to assign a probability to her willingness to
go out with you. Although that situation appears to be most ordinary, we need to make
4If we can perform a measurement twice in a row. If the outcomes of the two measurements always
coincide, we say that the measurement is a first-kind measurement.
5When the state already is a the eigenstate of the observable than no information is either lost or
gained.
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clear how such a mixed state may arise in our context. In the world of QL-minded agents
there exist three possible scenario:
- the state has been prepared to a mixed state i.e., information provided in terms of a
probability distribution over possible states6;
- an introspective complete measurement is initiated but not completed. The initial
superposition has decohered into a probabilistic mixture of the possible states but not
collapsed into one of the eigenstates;7
- a superposed state has spontaneously decohered;
In the present paper we shall not consider spontaneous decoherence as we do not
explicitly consider time evolution. We focus on probabilistic mixture induced by the
environment through well-identified new information or by means of an introspective
mental processes.
1-3. Intentionality: a preferred basis
We shall assume that an individual endeavours to construct a representation i.e., learn
about the world because he has some concern in mind e.g., he has to select an action.
This assumption is consistent with psychological and neurobiological evidence that human
cognitive processes (including perception) are structured by some form of intentionality.
A perspective is defined as an "observable" that is an operator R that applies on the
state or mental picture. It is characterized by its eigenvalues {r1, ...rn} interpreted as
the possible eigenpictures belonging perspective R . A perspective is a "complete set of
commuting observables" so that a eigenstate in any perspective is a maximal information
state. Consequently and importantly any two perspectives R 6= P yield alternative de-
scriptions of the same "world". A pure mental picture can written as a superposition of
the possible eigenpictures in any perspective of the (relevant) world:
|ϕ〉 =
∑
i
λi|ri〉,
∑
j
λ2i = 1, λi ∈ R
which can also writes as a density operator
ρ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|
When the initial mental picture is not a pure state but a statistical mixture of pure states,
it can only be represented with a density operator ρ:
ρ =
∑
i
τi |ϕi〉〈ϕi| , τi ≥ 0 ,
∑
j
τi = 1
where |ϕi〉〈ϕi| is a classical “ket-bra” notation to represent the orthogonal projector on
the vector |ϕi〉. The density operator allows to express a situation where the agent’s
mental state is characterized by both intrinsic uncertainty and incomplete information.
6You know your friend received the results of a determinant exam but only the probability for the
outcomes, if she passed she is in a mood to go out.
7You have reflected over her mood and formulated the uncertainty without "solving it" for yourself.
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An action problem is defined as a correspondence fromD : H→ A whereH is the space
of mental pictures of the world and A the set of actions. For each (mentally represented)
state of the world, it defines which actions the agent wants to undertake.
Hypothesis 1
There exists a perspective R∗ such that D is a coarsening of R∗.8
Hypothesis 1 implies that if the agent receives (maximal) information framed in per-
spective R∗ he will know exactly what to do. We also say that R∗ is fully congruent with
D. Generally, D has a lower dimensionality than H, i.e., distinct eigenpictures can call
for the same action.
1-4. The learning process
In our context, it is in place to distinguish between two essentially different operations
in the learning process9. We shall present them as two successive phases.
The first phase of the mental process is an interaction between the mind (mental pic-
ture) and the outside world. The individual acquires new information expressed within
some perspective. This is a very important point: information is not "neutral", it is
always framed i.e., it comes together with a perspective (model) of the world. Because
it is framed, to integrate a piece of information, the individual may have to (temporar-
ily) switch to the perspective in which it is formulated. Either the information belongs
to the initial perspective R or to some alternative perspective P, P 6= R. In both cases
information acquisition corresponds to a fully deterministic evolution of the mental pic-
ture. It operates on the initial state(picture) so as to project it onto the one picture
encoding the information content provided. In the terminology of QM, phase 1 re-
sembles a process of preparation10: ρ → ρ′ where ρ′ is the new density matrix. Let
ρ =
∑
i θi |ri〉〈ri|,
∑
i θi = 1. If the information is consistent with R, ρ
′ =
∑
i θ
′
i |ri〉〈ri|,
where θ′i are calculated according to the familiar Bayes rule. We have a classical case of
belief updating. The interesting case is when P 6= R, the mental picture is then "forced"11
into the perspective P and ρ′ in basis {|pj〉} writes:
ρ′ =
∑
i
γi |pi〉〈pi| ,
∑
γi = 1,
8A measurement M ′ is coarser than M if every eigenset of M is contained in some eigenset of M ′,
see Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky [7, 8] p. 334.
9Describing the two phases as essentially different is a simplification because information acquisition
is not "direct" either. It also involves mental processes: perception is not neutral and not always classical
(cf quantum zeno effect). Nevertheless a major distinction between the 2 phases is that the first involves
an input from the outside while the second does not.
10In Physics a preparation procedure operates on a large number of systems to filter those whose
properties are the desired ones. But one can also prepare a single system into a specific state by submitting
it to a series of measuremnt until de desired result is obtained. The idea we retain is that the procedure
secures that the system is in a specified state.
11Clearly the individual could neglect the information and he would not be forced into anything. But
if he wants to integrate it, he must exert some mental flexibility and switch to the perspective in which
that information takes its meaning.
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Depending on the provided information content the density matrix may be a pure state
or mixed state (if the information content is probabilistic).
A first central point to emphasize is that when PR 6= RP i.e., we are dealing with
incompatible (alternative) perspectives, information embodied in ρ the initial state is lost
in the process. A preparation in P modifies the mental picture into a specific mental
picture distinct from the initial one and the result is the same whatever the initial state
in R. Again this would not have been the case if the provided information was in terms
of the same perspective as the initial state R. Of course this is a simplification but it it
aims at capturing the following. The loss of information reflects the fact that the two
pieces of informations (ρ and ρ′) do not form a consistent picture for the individual. It is
as if they are expressed in two different languages that do not translate into each other
unambiguously and the individual cannot but think (form a mental picture) in either one.
In reality, the process is of course much more complex. In particular, as earlier mentioned
the individual may keep some memory.
Phase 2: Updating The second phase is a purely mental operation which does not
appeal to the outside world. It is an introspective measurement operation. It measures
the mental state ρ′ with respect to the preferred perspective R∗. This operation may
be conceptually decomposed into two steps in a way originally proposed by von Neuman
(1932). The first step corresponds to the formulation of the mental picture in terms
of a convex combination (probabilistic mixture) of possible outcomes in the preferred
perspective R∗. This corresponds to making the measurement but not registering the
result. The state is projected on the preferred basis and decohered. The second step
entails a decision - one (or a subset of possible) result is singled out. It corresponds to
registering the result of the measurement. We shall refer to these two steps as respectively
analysis and decision.
a. Analysis
Generally, the concerns that determine intentionality may not require a complete
measurement. So both the analytical step and the decision step may be coarse (as opposed
to fine or complete measurement). In that case the outcome will entail the preservation of
some quantum coherence so the state obtained after the decision is also a superposition.
We next describe the process for a complete measurement which fully decoheres the state
into a mixture of eigenpictures of R∗ before selecting one of them. The state ρ′ is expressed
in terms of the projectors associated with the eigenvectors of R∗ :
ρ′ =
∑
k,l
(∑
i
γi〈r∗k||pi〉〈pi||r∗l 〉
)
|r∗k〉〈r∗l |
The ρ′ contains off the diagonal elements which do not correspond to any eigenstate of
R∗, they cannot be observed. The analysis step associated with a complete measurement
corresponds to projecting the state into the R∗ perspective, i.e., decoherence takes place
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so only diagonal elements are left: ρ′ → ρ∗ = ∑j |r∗j 〉〈r∗j | ρ′ |r∗j 〉〈r∗j | and we write ρ∗ :
ρ∗ =
∑
k
θ∗k |r∗k〉〈r∗k|
with diagonal coefficients θ∗j =
∑
i γi| 〈pi| r∗j 〉|2 ,
∑
j θ
∗
j = 1. This new density operator is
the result of "analysis" in the sense that the possible results have been identified with
their respective probability for occurrence. Some information from the preparation stage
is "transmitted" modulo the correlation coefficients |〈r∗i | pj〉| which are the probabilistic
weights attached to the eigenstates in ρ∗. Some information is "lost" with the disappear-
ance of the non-diagonal elements. The correlation coefficients linking two representations
are features of the mind; they may but need not reflect features of the world that is rep-
resented. This is a fundamental distinction between quantum cognition and quantum
mechanics. In Quantum Mechanics the correlation coefficients pertains to observables
representing properties of a physical system. The subject matter of the present investiga-
tion is not the world but the represented world which is a mental construct. In particular,
our model applies to the representation of classical objects. The coefficient captures the
quantum-like structure of the mind actualized in cognitive activity.
b. Decision
The decision step is a non-deterministic process. When the updating phase corre-
sponds to a complete measurement, the resulting density operator represents an eigen-
picture of the preferred perspective12. Decision selects one of the |r∗j 〉〈r∗j | with the corre-
sponding probability θ∗j
ρ∗ → ρ∗∗ = |r∗j 〉〈r∗j |.
At this point, the individual has a maximally informed mental picture in R∗ and all
information in P from ρ′ has been "lost". Recall that it affected the mental process through
the probability for obtaining any of the possible results. We see that after completing the
cognitive process corresponding to interpreting the information in his own mental model,
the agent’s actual state of information is a maximal information state which cannot be
easily traced back to the initial ρ or even to intermediary ρ′ and ρ∗. We next develop a
simple numerical example.
Example
In this section we illustrate the learning process defined above in numerical example.
Consider a two dimensional Hilbert space and a 2X2 density matrix in the canonical
preferred basis R∗. Let ρ represent the initial state ρ = .25|r∗1〉〈r∗1|+ 0.75|r∗2〉〈r∗2|
(1) ρ =
(
.25 0
0 .75
)
.
Phase 1: Information acquisition
12The state resulting from a coarse measurement is a pure state that is a superposition of eigenpictures.
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Consider an alternative perspective P with two eigenpictures {p1, p2} . The basis
{|p1〉, |p2〉 } corresponds to a rotation of {|r∗1〉, |r∗2〉 } by an angle of pi/8 . The agent
receives incomplete information in P i.e., the true state is either p1 or p2 with respec-
tive probability γ1 = (2 +
√
2)/4 and γ2 = (2 −
√
2)/4. The density operator repre-
senting the state that obtains as a result of the acquisition of the new information is
ρ′ = (2 +
√
2)/4|p1〉〈p1|+ (2−
√
2)/4|p2〉〈p2|. Note that ρ′ does not depend on ρ, it only
reflects the newly acquired information.
Phase 2: Updating
The density operator must now be written in terms of the |r∗i 〉〈r∗i | projectors ρ′ =
.75|r∗1〉〈r∗1|+ 0.25|r∗2〉〈r∗2|+ 0.25|r∗1〉〈r∗2|+ .25|r∗2〉〈r∗1| or
(2) ρ′ =
(
.75 .25
.25 .25
)
.
After the analysis step, the matrix ρ′ given in (2) becomes
(3) ρ′′ =
(
.75 0
0 .25
)
.
Only the diagonal elements (representing observable states) are left. If we compare the
matrices ρ and ρ′′, we observe that the probabilities associated with the eigenpictures of
the preferred perspective have been inverted so if we complete the measurement, there is
now 75% chance that the agent ends up being convinced of r1 instead of 25% as before
he acquired new information. In order to better understand why this is a reflection of
cognitive constraints we need to introduce the concept of dispersion entropy and explore
further the example which we do below.
2. Learning under irreducible uncertainty
2-1. Dispersion entropy - a measure of doubt
In this section we propose a concept of entropy that captures the amount of (relative)
uncertainty that characterizes the mental picture of an agent. The first important point
is that this uncertainty is not “absolute” but relative to a specific perspective e.g., corre-
sponding to some objective that requires action. To make the point most clear we shall
therefore confine ourselves to pure states i.e., states of maximal information. In those
states, the corresponding mental picture is a superposition of eigenpictures i.e., the only
uncertainty that is left is due to the quantum-like structure of the mind.
Shannon entropy which measures uncertainty associated with a classical probability
is defined for a discrete probability distribution {pj} according to
S = −
∑
j
pj log pj .

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It has been generalized by von Neumann to apply to quantum states and in particular to
density operators. Let ρ =
∑
λi |ϕi〉 〈ϕi|:
S (ρ) = −tr (ρ log ρ)
or equivalently for
S (ρ) = −
∑
λi log λi.
As does Shannon entropy, von Neumann entropy measures the amount of uncertainty due
to incomplete information while we are interested in measuring intrinsic uncertainty. We
therefore talk about the entropy of dispersion rather than of probability distribution.13
The relative entropy of dispersion is defined:
Definition The dispersion entropy of a pure state ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| with |ψ〉 =∑λi |ϕi〉 ,∑λ2i =
1 relative to a specific perspective A with eigenvectors {|ai〉} is
S (ρ,A)
.
= −
∑
αj logαj
where αj =
∑
i λ
2
i |〈aj| ϕi〉|2 ,
∑
αi = 1.
A few important remarks:
1. Dispersion entropy is a relative concept, it varies with the perspective;
2. Dispersion entropy is equivalent with the von Neumann entropy of the mental
picture ρ′ =
∑
αi |ai〉 decohered by the measurement of A but before the decision (see
analysis in Phase 2 of section 2.2 ).
3. S (ρ,A) = 0 when the mental picture |ϕ〉 is an eigenpicture of A and is positive
otherwise.
In contrast with the standard concept of entropy we cannot say that the dispersion
entropy of a pure state measures how much information we might gain by actually per-
forming the measurement - because we are in a zero von Neumann entropy state. The
S (ρ,A) of pure state ρ captures the non epistemic impact of the operation of measurement
of A on the mental picture .14
In the context of quantum cognition we would like to link dispersion entropy to a
psychological state of "doubt".15 S (ρ,A) is then a measure of the extent of "inner un-
certainty". It can be resolved by an introspective measurement.16 An introspective mea-
surement does not only take the logical consequence of information (the projection that
decoheres the state), it also includes a resolution (what we called "decision").17 Another
13See sect 2.2 above.
14Clearly the definition could be extended to include arbitrary state i.e., mixed state. It would then
capture the combined uncertainty from incomplete information and intrinsic uncertainty and would re-
main a relative concept.
15The term doubt is used in it s psychological meaning i.e., not the cartesian rational doubt that
defines the scientific approach.
16It could also be resolved by information acquisition in perspective A.
17Another way to put it is that an introspective measurement is a way to deal with "doubts" where
doubt is not (only) a problem of information but an inner state of lack of conviction.
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way to put it is that a (complete) introspective measurement operates on a pure mental
picture to resolve a state of doubt or lack of conviction.
We next develop a simple argument showing how additional information can increase
dispersion entropy relative to the preferred basis. For the purpose of the argument, we
assume that the agent’s mental state is initially an eigenpicture of his preferred perspective
|ϕ〉 = |r∗2〉. This state reflects information that is perfectly congruent with R∗ but is
framed in R : |ϕ〉 = ∑λi |ri〉 (= |r∗2〉) . The agent is not aware of r∗2 unless he updates
"his beliefs" which corresponds to the (measurement) operation of R∗ . If he did, he
would obtain
R∗|ϕ〉 = |r∗2〉,
with probability 1. He would then be fully determined i.e., convinced with respect to the
decision problem. There would not be any (relevant) uncertainty left with γ2 = 1 we have
S (ρ,R∗) = 0. But assume that instead he acquires new information relative to another
but related aspects of the issue. We denote this perspective P. This corresponds to steps
1 of the cognitive process above. The mental state |ϕ〉 is prepared into |ϕ′〉 equal to some
|pi〉 i.e., information is maximal in perspective P. "Enriched" with this new information,
the agent now updates his mental picture with respect to his preferred perspective (step
2):
|ϕ′〉 = |p2〉 =
∑
j
γj|r∗j 〉 → any |r∗j 〉 with probability γ2j 6= 1
We see that while he previously potentially “knew” r∗2 (but was unaware of it) he is now
in a state of hesitation where he believes that there is only a probability of γ22 < 1 that
the “true” eigenpicture is r∗2.18 The acquisition of new information has triggered the loss
of "conviction" reflecting previously held information which is in effect lost leaving the
agent in a state of intrinsic uncertainty captured by a strictly positive dispersion entropy:
S (ρ′, R∗) = −
∑
j
γ2j log γ
2
j > 0.
where ρ′ =
∑
j γ
2
j |r∗j 〉〈r∗j |.
Proposition. Assume that the agent’s mental state is one eigenpicture of his preferred
perspective, acquiring additional information in terms of a perspective that is not com-
patible with the preferred one affects the mental state so as to increase dispersion entropy
reflecting doubt or lost conviction.
This is an important result. From the point of view of "inner conviction" additional
information is unambiguously detrimental when the starting point is an eigenpicture of
the preferred perspective as illustrated in the argument above: the new information nec-
essarily induces uncertainty with respect to the agent’s action relevant perspective. More
generally i.e., starting from an arbitrary eigenpicture (possibly mixed and with non zero
relative dispersion entropy) as in the example above, new information may either decrease
18After the introspective process, he will end up believing r∗2 with some probability less than 1.
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or increase dispersion entropy. In the next section we discuss possible implications for
rational learning.
Remark 1 In our case r∗2 is true because it reflects an information congruent with R∗ and
|pi〉 is also true. The agent is not mistaken. He simply cannot hold in one single picture
both informations. The introspective operation when processing information p2 involves
the whole (cognitively limited) mind and therefore upsets earlier held beliefs..
We illustrate the result in Proposition 1 in figure 2 where the dimensionality of a
perspective is 2. The broad line corresponds to the preparation stage and the thin lines
to the measurement.
Figure 2. Detrimental information
Example cont.
Using the numerical example above, we illustrate the impact of new information on
dispersion entropy. The starkest results appears when starting out with ρ = |r∗2〉〈r∗2| and
assume that the state was generated as the result of the acquisition of maximal information
in perspective R∗ and thus associated with zero dispersion entropy relative to R∗. After
acquiring information the state of knowledge/conviction is ρ′ = |p1〉〈p1| = 2+
√
2
4
|r∗1〉〈r∗1| +√
2
4
(|r∗1〉〈r∗2|+ |r∗2〉〈r∗1|)+ 2−√24 |r∗2〉〈r∗2|. Then ρ′′ = 2+√24 |r∗1〉〈r∗1|+ 2−√24 |r∗2〉〈r∗2|. The new
state is associated with the following dispersion entropy S(ρ′, R∗) = −2+
√
2
4
log
(
2+
√
2
4
)−
2−√2
4
log
(
2−√2
4
)
= 0.4165 > S(ρ,R∗) = 0.
So now we readily see that new information created a state of doubt when there should
not have been any - the agent has maximal information with respect to the perspective
relevant to his decision. The doubt does not arise as the result of the information content
associated with |p1〉〈p1| but exclusively as the result on the cognitive constraint expressed
by the incompatibility between the two perspectives corresponding to R∗ and P respec-
tively.
Remark 2 It must be emphasized if we relax slightly the assumption that |ϕ〉 = |r∗2〉
(i.e., allowing for initial incomplete information), the result in the Proposition can be
obtained with a classical model of a different flavor.19 Assume the agent has priors
that puts nearly all the weight (but not all) on r∗2. Next, he receives information p2. If
19See Dubois and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2014)for a detailed argument.
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according to the agent’s structural model, that information is highly correlated with r∗1,
he updates his beliefs and is now less certain about what to do than he was before he got
the information. His new beliefs exhibit a distribution with higher entropy. However, he
has not lost information as in the quantum case. Instead the interpretation is that his
priors were wrong so new information brought him closer to the truth.
In view of the remark above a legitimate question is: are we only talking about
interpretation or do quantum cognitive limitations really have a more profound bearing
on learning? The next section addresses this question.
2-2. Rational Learning under Irreducible Uncertainty
Learning whether it is by classically minded agent or QL-minded ones is always about
the construction of a mental representation of the world. In our context it is important
to distinguish between two properties of a representation. On the one hand the mental
picture may be more or less informationally complete. And on the other hand, the mental
picture may be more or less connected with the outside world it is supposed to represent.
In a classical context this distinction also exists and information from the outside world is
used to complement and test the mental representation. If the picture is incomplete, new
information will bring it closer to the outside truth. If the model is wrong attempts to
update it with new information will give rise to inconsistencies. It should be stressed that
no satisfactory approach exists as to how a classically minded agent proceeds in face of
data revealing failures of the underlying model. There is no obvious incremental path of
modifications (the notion of distance is ambiguous at best) and certainly no prescription
for discrete jumps between alternative models.
For a quantum-like agent, the situation is similar except that there is not one sin-
gle "true" model (mental picture) but a multiplicity of Bohr complementary (correlated)
"true" models. Discrete jumps between representations are parts of the cognitive process
by force of complementarity. With quantum cognition the link between the epistemic
state (the mental picture) of the represented world and the world in itself is ambiguous.
In fact the term "epistemic state" does not seem proper in face of intrinsic indeterminacy
as the multiplicity of zero entropy states suggests. As repeatedly emphasized by cog-
nitive scientists we cannot address knowledge without simultaneously addressing human
cognitive activity. As we shall see this takes a precise meaning in our context.
2-2-1. Bayesian and QL-learning
Bayesian learning operates within a Boolean algebra. The objective is to learn the
parameters of the model of the system.20 Provided the priors are not inconsistent with
the true model, we know (Schwartz 1965) that starting from any such priors Bayesian
updating converges to the true state.
With quantum learning, we are in a Hilbert space, that is there exists a variety of
resolutions of the system i.e., a variety of perspectives, of valid theories of the system.
20Some consider also Bayesain updating with multiple priors (see e.g., Hanany and Klibanov [18]).
But there is no consensus as to how to proceed - in sharp contrast with Bayesian updating of single priors.
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Therefore, the state of knowledge of a quantum minded individual does not converge with
new information but can evolve forever. Consider again the example above. After the
agent performed the introspective measurement R∗, if the agent is being asked about
his understanding in P, he will perform a new measurement of the eigenpicture resulting
from the first measurement and ρ′ will not be recovered. Performing those measurements
alternately, he will keep oscillating without converging i.e., without being able to settle for
a definite value in both P and R∗ simultaneously. 21 Of course this example is simplistic
and the agent might simply remember ρ′. But in more sophisticated context, we expect
the modification of the mental picture to be effective.
In Quantum Mechanics, irreducible uncertainty gave rise to a rich philosophical de-
bate about the nature of reality (see e.g., D’Espaganat 1979). In our context when the
irreducible uncertainty is a consequence of the quantum structure of the mind, new ques-
tions arise. The mental picture can also "drift away" from a "truthful representation" of
the outside world. 22 We next briefly discuss what rational learning may mean in such a
situation.
2-2-2. The object of QL-learning and “Knowledge about the world”
In quantum mechanics when physicists were confronted with the impossibility of first
hand objectification, they resorted to second hand objectification. That is basically the
Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics. It captures how measurements impact on
the system and how measurements are related among each other. The state vector is
the central object that encapsulates all information and it is the basis for making pre-
dictions. Similarly, the situation we are facing in quantum cognition suggests that the
primary object of scientific learning must be the human mind i.e., the structure of mental
perspectives, how they affect the mental representation of the world and how they are
related to each other. The current mental picture is the state of the representation, it
encapsulates the information known to the individuals and it is the basis for making pre-
diction and further operations. This structure is assumed to exhibit invariance reflecting
psychological regularities.23
Hence we propose that the primary object of QL-learning is the human cognitive
process - the non-boolean algebra of mental perspectives. What knowledge about the
outside world concern, we have seen that for QL-minded agents knowledge about the
world is a mental picture that reflects both inputs from the outside world (information)
and input from the inside world (decision in introspective measurement). At any point
21The general result is a transposition into cognition of the basic feature of quantum mechanics namely
that it is not possible for complementary properties to have a determinate value simultaneously.
22The role of the acquisition of new information from an incompatible perspective is neither a comple-
ment nore a test of the truthfulness of the current picture. But it is an operation that forces a (temporary)
reconnection between the mental picture and the outside world. Only information within the perspective
of the mental picture is a true test in a way similar to learning in the classical world with classically
minded agents.
23At least we do expect invariance at the individual level.
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of time the representation we have of the world depends on the path of information
acquisition and introspective measurements performed. By choosing a specific path, the
individual chooses - let be in a non-deterministic manner - his "world". He is the creator of
the world he lives in. We know from psychologists that people systematically underscore
their responsibility in failure (relative to bad luck) and overscore their impact on success.
It has been suggested that this can be fully rational to optimize motivation and self-
image.24 The quantum cognitive approach provides a framework for effectively acting in
this manner, it internalizes the (emotional) constraints that justify lying to oneself into
cognition itself. Since QL-agents do have some freedom in the determination of the world
they live in - it only seems rational to create a world in which we are more productive
and feel good.
Rational learning about the world transforms into a choice problem the outcome of
which affects our well-being in a way similar to other choices. As all creative processes,
it is constrained - the cognitive process is structured. Moreover one should not end up
with a mental picture that is fully disconnected with the outside world because that un-
dermines the value of our actions which are based on that mental picture. But we are
invited to recognize a significant freedom. We thus propose that rational construction of a
representation of the world entails selecting what information to acquire and which intro-
spective measurements to perform so as to produce a mental picture that maximizes our
well-being in the actual world. For instance when having very specific practical concerns
adequacy between the mental picture and the outside world may be particularly valuable.
In such a case a strong conviction in a less relevant perspective obtained after a series of
introspective measurements may benefit from being upset by new information. Future
research is called upon to characterize rational learning by QL-agent in terms of optimal
decision-making with respect to information acquisition and introspective measurements.
Concluding remarks
This paper is a first exploration of learning by cognitively limited agents where the lim-
itations are modeled appealing to quantum like characteristics of the mind. A main
motivation is that the quantum approach has shown successful in explaining behavioral
anomalies in decision-making while it also seems able to capture concerns expressed by
practitioners dealing with information transmission and communication. In particular,
the fact that i. people reason about reality within the frame of some perspective (“mental
script”) or as we call it, a mental picture, ii, the multiplicity of potential representations of
reality generates specific problems for learning. We model cognitive limitations in terms
of the multiplicity of Bohr complementary mental representations of one and the same
reality. We find that with intrinsic uncertainty, additional information induce loss of
information that can be detrimental.
Our analysis calls for a new approach to learning. First, it puts the cognitive process
24The idea is that motivation is not fully maleable and must be incited: if you feel bad about yourself
youmay not find the energy to make bold moves.
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at the center: that is the logical structure behind the geometry of perspectives. Second,
it unveils a form of creative freedom in the construction of a mental representation that
invites a fully different approach. Namely learning about the world becomes a part of
decision-making whose objective is to maximize well-being.
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